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Note

Joinder of Criminal Offenses in
Nebraska: Judicial Discretion v.
Fair and Impartial Trial
State v. Nance, 197 Neb. 95,
246 N.W.2d 868 (1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Nance,' the Supreme Court of Nebraska, over
the dissent of Justice McCown, 2 held that two or more separate
criminal offenses may be joined in the same information and indictment, and tried in the same proceeding when the offenses charged
are of the "same or similar character." Although the defendant
in Nance moved for severance of the offenses, the supreme court
held that the trial court had complete discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny such a motion absent a showing of "actual" prejudice to the defendant. In applying such a strict rule
on severance, the supreme court has given Nebraska trial courts
even broader discretion in trying criminal cases, at the expense of
the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. This note will
discuss the impact of Nance upon the criminal process, and will
explore the policies which militate against allowing such broad discretion in joinder cases.
II. THE FACTS
The defendant in Nance was charged in a seven count information with the commission of three separate robberies, 3 and moved
1. 197 Neb. 95, 246 N.W.2d 868 (1976).
2. Id. at 105, 246 N.W.2d at 873. Justice McCown's dissent will be discussed in greater detail in part IV of the text.
3.
In count I of a seven count information, the defendant, Edgar
L. Nance, was charged with the robbery of Daniel Short on
May 28, 1975, under section 28-414, R.R.S. 1943. Count II
charged the defendant with the use of a firearm in the commission of that robbery under section 28-1011.21, R.R.S. 1943.
Counts III and IV charged the defendant with the robbery of
Mary West on May 29, 1975, and with the use of a firearm
in the commission of that robbery. Counts V and VI charged
the defendant with being an habitual criminal under section
29-2221, R.R.S. 1943.
Id. at 96, 246 N.W.2d at 869.
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to sever the counts relating to each individual offense. 4 The trial
court partially granted the motion by severing the charges relating
to one of the robberies but consolidating the other two for trial.
The jury found the defendant guilty on the two joined counts
of robbery, 5 and he was sentenced to serve five to seven years for
each. The sentences were to run concurrently, but consecutive to
a four year sentence imposed in an earlier trial on the severed robbery count. On appeal, the defendant made two assignments of
error: (1) that the district court committed reversible error in
allowing evidence of a one-man showup to be presented to the
jury; and (2) that the district court committed reversible error in
partially overruling the defense motion for severance of the offenses.6
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court in their entirety. In denying the first assignment of error
relating to the evidence obtained in the one-man showup and used
in the trial on the severed robbery count, the court applied the
legal principles of Neil v. Biggers.7 Neil stated that the critical
issue in such a case is whether the showup procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant was denied due process. 8 The court
4. NEB.REv. STAT. § 29-2002(4) (Reissue 1975), provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the state would be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder of offenses
in separate indictments, informations, or complaints for trial
together, the court may order an election for separate trials
of counts, indictments, informations, or complaints, grant a
severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
5.
The trial court had dismissed the charge of using a firearm
in the commission of the Short robbery after the close of the
State's case; and the jury found the defendant not guilty of
the charge of using a firearm in the commission of the West
robbery. Upon defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed
Count VII of the information, which charged the defendant
with being an habitual criminal.
197 Neb. at 96-97, 246 N.W.2d at 869.
6. Id. at 97, 246 N.W.2d at 869. The first assignment of error related only
to testimony in the earlier separate robbery trial, and did not challenge the identification procedure used in the trial on the joined robbery counts. A "showup" is a process used to identify a single defendant. Unlike a "lineup," only one person is presented for identification.
7. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
8. The United States Supreme Court concluded, in Neil, that it "is the
likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to

JOINDER
concluded that there was "no substantial likelihood of misidentification in this case" 9 and that admission of the identification obtained in the one-man showup was proper because it was the best
method of identification available under the circumstances. 10
The court based its decision concerning the second assignment
of error, which related to the joinder of the two separate offenses,
upon section 29-2002(1) of the Nebraska statutes," holding that the
two robberies were joined properly under the statute because they
were of the "same or similar character.' 1 2 In support of its holding,
the court cited a New Jersey case' 3 which upheld the joinder of
two separate counts of selling heroin under a court rule which, like
section 29-2002(1), allowed joinder of offenses of the "same or similar character."'1 4 It also cited the Nebraska cases of State v. Rod-

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

due process . . . . [T]he admission of evidence of a showup without
more does not violate due process." Id. at 198.
197 Neb. at 101, 246 N.W.2d at 871. The court reached this conclusion
based upon the following facts: (1) The witness, who had been in
close proximity with the criminal for more than thirty minutes, made
a positive unequivocal identification, and had given a generally accurate description to the police prior to the showup, including reference
to a green shirt and medallions of the type later found in the possession of the defendant; (2) the showup was held only one day after
the crime took place; and (3) the defendant's own statements to the
police indicated that he had committed the crime, and his statement
of the events that occurred was substantially the same as the witness's.
It was the defendant's own refusal to be in a lineup that necessitated
the use of a showup. On this point the court stated as follows:
The purpose of a rule barring evidence of unduly suggestive confrontations is to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure when a more reliable one may be available.
Neil v. Biggers, supra. In this case, the purpose of the rule
would not be fulfilled by excluding the evidence, for the police were prevented from conducting a more reliable identification procedure due to the defendant's own recalcitrance.
Id. at 101-02, 246 N.W.2d at 871.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2002(1) (Reissue 1975), provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information, or complaint in a separate count for each
offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, are of the same or similar character or are
based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts
or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan.
"We are of the opinion that the two robberies referred to were 'of the
same or similar character' under the Nebraska statute referred to
above, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses were committed
against two individuals, and with approximately 19 hours intervening
between the commission of the offenses." 197 Neb. at 103-04, 246
N.W.2d at 872.
State v. Baker, 49 N.J. 103, 228 A.2d 339 (1967).
Concerning the New Jersey rule, the court stated:
The New Jersey rule on joinder, like the Nebraska statute,
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gers,15 in which the court held it was not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to refuse to sever two counts of robbery involving separate service stations, and State v. McDonnell,'6 in which
the court refused to overturn the trial court's decision to try two
separate burglary counts jointly.
Nance's contention that it is inherently prejudicial to be forced
to defend on several unrelated counts at the same time because they
tend to reinforce each other, was rejected by the court." Reasoning
that the proper test in this case was whether or not "actual" prejudice had in fact occurred, the court stated that the defendant had
"made no actual showing of how he was, or may have been, prejudiced."' 8 On this basis, the court held that severance was a matter of judicial discretion 9 rather than a matter of right where no
"actual" prejudice had been shown, upheld the trial court's refusal
to grant a severance of the offenses, 20 and rejected the defendant's
second assignment of error. 2' Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court
ruled that a decision to try criminal offenses jointly if they are
of the "same or similar character" and have been charged in the

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

permits joinder of offenses of the "same or similar character."
In that case, the defendant was charged with the sale of heroin in two indictments. Each indictment charged a single
sale, one to a federal agent on January 10, 1963; and one to
a Newark officer on March 4, 1963, almost two months later.
The court held that the two offenses were of the "same or
similar character," under its rules, and a joint trial of the separate indictments for the offenses was authorized.
197 Neb. at 104, 246 N.W.2d at 872-73.
186 Neb. 633, 185 N.W.2d 488 (1971).
192 Neb. 500, 222 N.W.2d 583 (1974).
See NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 29-2002(4) (Reissue 1975), supra note 4, which
allows severance where the defendant would be prejudiced by joinder.
197 Neb. at 105, 246 N.W.2d at 873. In support of its holding that no
"actual" prejudice to the defendant had been shown, the court stated
that "[t]he evidence on each robbery was distinct and simple. The
trial court separately instructed the jury on the elements of each count,
and a further instruction provided: 'The material elements of each
count will be considered separately by you and separate determination
made as to each Count.'" Id.
"The question of election between counts and the advisability of joint
or separate trials is one directed to the sound discretion of the trial
court." Id. at 104, 246 N.W.2d at 873.
In refusing to allow severance the court held: "It is clear, under our
procedure, that severance is not a matter of right, and a ruling of the
trial court with regard thereto will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of a showing of prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 105, 246
N.W.2d at 873.
"We conclude that the consolidation of the counts in this case was not
an abuse of discretion, and the defendant's second assignment of error
is without merit." Id.

JOINDER
same information and indictment, can be overturned only upon a
strong showing by the defendant of "actual" prejudice to him.
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION V.
FAIR, IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Imposition upon criminal defendants of such a strict standard
effectively lessens the likelihood that such a'defendant will receive
a fair and impartial trial. As pointed out by Justice McCown in
his dissent to the majority opinion: "[I]n this case the two robberies which were joined were completely separate offenses. They
involved different victims, different locations, different property,
and different witnesses. They did not even occur on the same
day."'22 In spite of the complete lack of any connection between
the two offenses, other than the fact that they both involved robberies and were alleged to have been committed by the same defendant, the prosecution was permitted to present all evidence relating to both offenses to the same jury. The evils inherent in
allowing joinder of separate, distinct criminal offenses for trial in
the same proceeding are, however, patently apparent.
In a criminal proceeding, the jury cannot help but be influenced
by the weight of the overall evidence presented. In fact, the introduction of evidence pertaining to offenses other than that for which
the defendant is being tried might very well be treated, consciously
or subconsciously, as cumulative by the individual trier of fact,
thereby creating, in his mind, a more compelling case for conviction
than would the presentation of evidence relating only to the relevant single crime. It is noteworthy that the Nebraska Supreme
Court has recognized the prejudice which can result to a criminal
defendant when evidence of other unconnected crimes is admitted
by the trial court. State v. Casados 23 exemplified the concern of
the court on this matter when it held that "proof of another distinct
substantive crime is not admissable in a criminal prosecution unless
there is some legal connection between the two upon which it can
be said that one tends to establish the other or some essential fact
or issue."124 Casados restated a widely accepted rule of evidence
and procedure in criminal cases. 25 It is based on the notion that
22. Id.
23. 188 Neb. 91, 195 N.W.2d 210 (1971).
24. Id. at 95, 195 N.W.2d at 213.
25. As stated in 1 S. GARD, JONES ox EviENscE § 4: 18, at 417 (6th ed.
1972):
Peculiarly applicable to criminal cases is the rule which
prohibits the introduction of evidence of other wholly independent offenses as the basis for an inference that the defend-
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evidence of another unrelated crime might be given too much
weight by the jury or might otherwise unduly prejudice the defendant's case.26
Allowing joint trial of separate criminal offenses of the "same
or similar character" at the almost total discretion of the trial court
provides an effective means for circumventing the rule that evidence of other crimes inadmissible. It does so by condoning the
admission of evidence pertaining to crimes which the defendant is
merely alleged to have committed.2 7 If the admission of evidence
pertaining to crimes of which the defendant has been convicted is
improper due to the prejudice which might result to the defendant's
case, then how much more compelling should be the policy behind
refusing to allow the admission of evidence pertaining to crimes
of which the defendant has merely been accused! Since a defendant is deemed to be innocent of crimes with which he is charged
until proven guilty, the evidence admitted into trial on the unrelated criminal offense, where two or more offenses have been
joined, is evidence relating to a crime of which the defendant is,
ant is guilty of the offense for which he is being tried. Otherwise stated, it is not proper, to show by proof of previous
bad conduct that he has a propensity for committing the
crime, and because he committed other crimes on previous occasions he probably committed the crime in question.
This rule will be referred to in the text as the "other crimes" rule.
For other evidence of the widespread acceptance of the "other crimes"
rule, see 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302 (3d ed. 1940).
26.

Although it has been treated as a rule of relevancy, and
is here so classified, the rule is recognized, not because the
evidence of previous offenses is irrelevant, but for other more
plausible reasons. One basic reason for the rule is that such
evidence is apt to be given too much weight, rather than too
little, by the jury, thus resulting in the conviction of a defendant because he is a bad man and not because of his specific
guilt of the offense with which he is charged.
It is a sound rule of public policy and therefore exclusionary in the sense that it keeps out relevant evidence for justifiable reasons. Besides the highly prejudicial character of
such evidence there are the considerations that a defendant
is entitled to be tried only for the crime charged against him,
that he is entitled to notice and the right to prepare his defense to any charges brought against him free from surprise,
that the evidence of collateral crimes would tend to confuse
the jury and divert them from the real issues, that bad character cannot be proved by evidence of specific acts, and that
the state is not entitled to attack the character of the accused
until he has offered evidence of his good character.
1 S. GARD, supra note 25, at 418-19.
27. Justice McCown pointed out that "the same reason exists for holding
that a trial for unconnected separate crimes should be separated if
requested." 197 Neb. at 106, 246 N.W.2d at 874.
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at least at that point in time, innocent. Yet, such evidence cannot
help but affect the jury's estimation of the defendant's propensities
to commit either or both crimes, regardless of how carefully the
trial judge might instruct on each particular count.
This fact has been recognized in a number of federal cases involving the joinder issue, which hold that a defendant is automatically prejudiced when the basis for joinder is the mere fact that
the offenses charged are of the "same or similar character" and that
the defendant is therefore entitled to severance as a matter of
right. 28 United States Attorneys, like Nebraska prosecutors, are
permitted to charge offenses of the "same or similar character" in
one indictment, 29 and federal district courts likewise are governed
by a provision which allows severance of the offenses if the defen31
30
dant is prejudiced by such a joinder.

In United States v. Foutz,

the defendant was charged with robbing the same bank twice
within a two and one-half month period. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit required severance of the offenses, using the rationale of the "other crimes" rule, on the
grounds of prejudice to the defendant. This was done in spite of
the fact that no "actual" prejudice to the defendant's case had been
32
demonstrated.

28. See, e.g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); Drew
v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Contra, United States
v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1976).
29.
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if
the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or
both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the
same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan.
FED. R. Cmv. P. 8 (a).
30.
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant
a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief
justice requires.
FED. R. CRim. P. 14.
31. 540 F.2d 733 (1976).
32. The court, in Foutz, did not require evidence of "actual" prejudice, but
noted that:
One inevitable consequence of a joint trial is that the jury
will be aware of evidence of one crime while considering the
defendant's guilt or innocence of another. If the rationale of
the "other crimes" rule is correct, it would seem that some
degree of prejudice is necessarily created by permitting the
jury to hear evidence of other crimes.
Id. at 736. For additional authority in support of this view, see 8
MooRE's FEDEaAL PaAcTICE
8.05 (2d ed. 1968); 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AN PRocEDuim § 143 (1969).
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In ruling that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court
not to grant severance, 33 the Foutz court adopted a test for prejudice which is consonant with, rather than violative of, the "other
crimes" rule. The court held that the test for prejudice, under the
joinder rule, was whether the evidence purported to have been prejudicial to the defendant's case could properly have been admitted
if the offenses had been tried separately. 34 It then concluded that
where joinder is based solely on the fact that the offenses are of
the "same or similar character," such evidence is generally inadmissible when the crimes are tried in separate proceedings, and is,
therefore, prejudicial under the "other crimes" test for prejudice. 35
Founding the test for prejudice, in motions for severance of
criminal offenses upon the admissibility of the evidence under the
"other crimes" rule strikes a much fairer balance between the interests of the state in joining such offenses, on the one hand, and the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial on the
other. The requirement that the defendant show "actual" prejudice
before severance will be granted results in a technical application
of the rule on severance which is inherently unfair. It is impossible
for the defendant to prove what went through the mind of each
individual juror as he or she heard the evidence presented and formulated a conclusion concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence.
33. "The granting of a severance under Rule 14 is committed to the discretion of the district court ....
In this case, we believe it was an
abuse of discretion not to grant a severance." 540 F.2d at 736 (citations omitted).
34. Realizing that not all evidence relating to other separate offenses is
inadmissible, the court in Foutz stated:
Although the law does not allow consideration of other
crimes as evidence of a defendant's criminal disposition, evidence of other crimes is admissible for certain other purposes
because its probative value is then thought to outweigh its
prejudicial effect. In those instances where evidence of one
crime is admissible at a separate trial for another, it follows
that a defendant will not suffer any additional prejudice if
the two offenses are tried together.
Id.
35. In so ruling, the court in Foutz distinguished between offenses joined
because they are based on the same transaction and offenses joined
simply because they are of the "same or similar character":
When offenses are joined under Rule 8 on the ground that
they "are based on the same transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan," it is manifest that evidence of
one offense would ordinarily be admissible at a separate trial
for the other. When offenses are joined because they "are of
the same or similar character," however, admissibility at separate trials is not so clear.
Id. at 737.

JOINDER

Thus, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that "actual" prejudice resulted to the defendant in most cases.
The objective test for prejudice espoused in Foutz, on the other
hand, would preclude the state from being able to violate the spirit
of the "other crimes" rule merely by affecting a joinder of separate
offenses for trial in a single proceeding. Furthermore, since it is
based upon whether or not such evidence would be admissible if
the joined offenses had been tried separately, the defendant could
show no prejudice if such evidence would have been admissible and
joinder would be appropriate. Such a result seems obviously to
be more in the interests of fair play and justice than does the
wooden application of an "actual" prejudice test.
Allowance of severance as a matter of right in cases where a
joinder of offenses has been effectuated because they are of the
"same or similar character" has also found favor in the ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND

SEVERANCE.

Although the rule on

joinder in section 1.1 of these STANDARDS is very similar to the rule

in Nebraska, permitting a joinder of similar offenses, 36 section
2.2 (a) allows severance as a matter of right in any situation
where offenses have been joined solely on that basis. 37 The commentary to section 2.2 (a), 38 states that "joinder together for one
trial of two or more offenses of the same or similar character
when the offenses are not part of a single scheme or plan has
been subjected to severe criticism over the years ....
,,30 The
same section also notes that the "test for whether joinder is proper
involves a weighing of the possible prejudice to the defendant from
joinder against the public interest in avoiding duplicitous, time-con36. ABA

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRnIINAL JUSTIcE: STANDARDS RELATING TO JONDMER AND SEVERANCE § 1.1, at 5 (final draft 1968),

states:
Two or more offenses may be joined in one charge, with

each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses,

whether felonies or misdemeanors or both:
(a) are of the same or similar character, even if not part
of a single scheme or plan; or
(b) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts
connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or
plan.
37. "Whenever two or more offenses have been joined for trial solely on
the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses." Id. § 2.2(a),
at 7.
38. Id. § 2.2(a) at 29.
39. Id.
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in which the same factual and legal issues must be
suming trials
'40
litigated.
As pointed out by the commentary, joinder of separate, distinct
offenses is difficult to justify on the basis of this test. Although
the time spent where similar offenses are joined may be lessened
by virtue of the fact that it is necessary to impanel a jury and
to set the defendant's background only once, such gain is minimal
when one considers that trial of each distinct offense is likely to
require its own evidence and witnesses. When the possibility of
the defendant being convicted by the cumulative weight of the evidence presented in such a trial is weighed against the slight gain
in terms of time saved at trial, joinder of separate offenses fails
to advance the state's interest to any sufficiently significant degree.
In fact, as noted by Justice McCown in his dissent, separate trials
on each offense may actually save the court's time in many cases
because "if the defendant should be found not guilty on one count,
the other counts may be prosecuted or dismissed as circumstances
warrant."'41 Because the state's interest in joining separate offenses
is only minimally perpetuated by such a rule, a rule on severance
which protects significant constitutional rights of the defendant in
a criminal proceeding would certainly seem justified.
V.

CONCLUSION

Considering the obvious prejudice which results to a defendant
when separate, distinct criminal offenses are joined for trial merely
because they are of the "same or similar character," the negative
aspects of joinder completely overshadow the slight advantage
gained by the state in allowing it. Demanding that a defendant
show "actual" prejudice before he will be allowed severance of the
offenses joined places an unfairly heavy burden upon him. The
end result is that the defendant is precluded from fully exercising
his right to a fair and impartial trial at the discretion of the trial
court. A test for prejudice based upon the admissibility of the evidence under the "other crimes" rule would provide a better guarantee for the rights of the defendant, while protecting the interests
of the state in having a rule on joinder. Justice McCown best summed up the reasons for adopting such a test in joinder cases when
he stated the following:
It seems to me better judicial policy to grant a defendant's motion
for separate trials when the only connection between the two
counts is that they are both robberies or both burglaries. The pos40. Id.
41. 197 Neb. at 107, 246 N.W.2d at 874.
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sibility of prejudice is obvious and the constitutional guaranty
of a fair trial should not have to rest on a technical interpretation
of a joinder statute. Neither should the effectiveness of the constitutional right to a fair trial be dependent upon an exercise of
judicial discretion in granting or denying a motion for separate
trial in a case like this.42

Lavern Holdeman '78
42. Id.

